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DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA: WHEN PRIVATE
PROPERTY MAY BE DAMAGED WITHOUT
COMPENSATION IN MISSOURI
J. NELSON HAPPY*

In perhaps no area of the law are the rules more contradictory, confusing and difficult to retain than in eminent domain, and one of the
most puzzling concepts in this area is damnum absqua injuria, damage
without legal injury. Almost everyone is familiar with the constitutional

provisions which guarantee that private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public purposes without payment of just compensation to its

owner. 1 However, there are many factual situations in which tangible
damage is done to real property as a result of the state's exercise, or threat
of exercising, the power of eminent domain, for which no compensation is
paid. This article is intended to examine the source of the power of

eminent domain and categorize the situations in which the owners of
property cannot recover compensation even though their proprietary rights
have been adversely affected.
I. THE PowER or

EMmENT DOMAIN-SouRcES AND

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

The power of eminent domain is inherent in the sovereign and is
exercised by the state for public purposes as authorized by legislative
enactment.2 Political subdivisions of the state, such as cities, do not have
the inherent power of condemnation but the state may delegate to these
subdivisions specific powers of eminent domain to be carried out for public
purposes.8 Such power must be dearly given in express terms or by necessary implication and is strictly construed.4
Constitutional provisions limit the power and the manner of exercise
of eminent domain in certain respects. State constitutional limitations5
*Assodate with the firm of Dietrich, Davis,
sas City, Missouri. B.S. Syracuse University,
School of Law, 1967.
1. U. S. CONST. amend. V; amend. XIV, §
2. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v.
534 (En Banc 1947); State ex rel. State Highway
36 S.W.2d 105 (En Banc 1931).

Burrell, Dicus, & Rowlands, Kan1964; J.D. Columbia University
1; Mo. CONST. art. 1, §§ 26, 28.
James, 356 Mo. 1161, 205 S.W.2d
Comnm'n v. Gordon, 327 Mo. 160,

3. State ex rel. Schwab v. Riley, 417 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. En Banc 1967); In re
Armory Site, 282 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1955).
4. State ex rel. Siegel v. Grimm, 314 Mo. 242, 284 S.W. 490 (En Banc 1926).
5. See Mo. CONST. art. I, §§ 26, 28; art. XI, § 4. Additionally, the Missouri
Constitution also defines certain purposes as those which are public purposes for
which private property may be condemned. See art. I, § 27 (excess property); art.
I, § 28 (drains, private ways, etc.); art. III, § 48 (memorials, etc.); art. IV, § 41
(game conservation); art. VI, § 21 (slum clearance); art. XI, § 4 (a) (corporate
franchises).

(453)
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are, of course, subject to the requirements of the United States Constitution,
which provides in the fifth amendment that "private property [shall
not] be taken for public use without just compensation," and in the
fourteenth amendment that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law ... ." These constitutional
provisions establish a yardstick by which the sufficiency of effectuating
legislation may be measured.
Article I, section 26 of the Missouri Constitution uses very broad
language when it states that "private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation." It has been held many
times that payment of damages to property owners is a prerequisite to the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, and that the owner of property
which is condemned may obtain injunctive relief preventing the state
or political subdivision from exercising control over the property prior to
the payment of damages.0 However, despite the broadness of these constitutional provisions and the primacy of the concept of the payment of
just compensation for taking or damaging property for public use, the
courts have engrafted numerous exceptions to these constitutional requirements.
II.

TYPES OF DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY CAUSED BY THE

EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR WHICH THE
OWNER Is NOT ENTITLED TO JUST COMPENSATION
Although hundreds of condemnation actions affecting thousands of
people are filed in Missouri courts every year, apparently no effort has been
made by the appellate courts of Missouri, or commentators, to categorize
and provide a logical framework for the numerous factual situations in
which property owners are prevented from obtaining compensation even
though the value of their property may be decreased as a result of the exercise of the power of condemnation. The following is a framework for
the categorization of these situations which may be useful in counseling
clients.
A. The Valid Exercise of the Police Power
Perhaps to the jurisprudential purist it is erroneous to indude the
valid exercise of the police power as a separate type of damage for which
no compensation is paid. It is true that the right to exercise eminent domain
arises from the inherent police power of the sovereign and the police power
encompasses many privileges other than that of the authority to condemn.
However, Missouri courts have tended to view the exercise of the police

6. State ex rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey, 801 Mo. 1, 256 S.W. 474
(En Banc 1924); McGrew v. Granite Bituminous Paving Co., 247 Mo. 549, 155
S.W. 411 (1918); Southern Illinois & M. Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1, 78 S.W.
453 (1903).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss4/1
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power as a type of eminent domain and therefore this category must come
within the scope of this article.
Most valid exercises of the police power are unquestioned because they
entail the use of police authority. For example, ordinances prohibiting or
regulating parking, prohibiting left turns, and other statutes and ordinances which regulate and control traffic are so obviously properly within
the scope of the police power that it is remarkable in this age of regulation
to note that cases once arose challenging this authority.7 However, the
state may sometimes enact legislation which has the effect of prohibiting
certain uses of private property which are not in themselves mischievous,
and legally refuse to pay the owner of property so regulated for damage
sustained by such legislation. It is important to examine the basis for this
result.
The most significant early case exempting the government from payment of damages arising from the regulation of use of property is St. Louis
Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of St. Louis.8 In that case the City
of St. Louis passed an ordinance regulating the height, the location, and
the materials to be used in the constrution of billboards and signs. The ordinance contained language that "no billboard hereafter erected, altered,
refaced or reconstructed" could exceed 14 feet in height above the ground
or be larger than 500 square feet in area, and also imposed certain limitations with respect to open space between the ground and the bottom of
the sign and provided for certain set-back requirements. 9 The plaintiff
argued that many of its signs were in need of repair and that the effect of
the ordinance would be to require it to rebuild most of the signs which
it had already constructed, thus taking private property for public use
without just compensation.
The court upheld the ordinance, noting that
[t]he signboards and billboards upon which this class of advertisements are displayed are constant menaces to the public safety
and welfare of the city; they endanger the public health, promote
immorality, constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals and
all classes of miscreants. They are also inartistic and unsightly. 10
The court then held that the nuisances created by unregulated billboards
could only be abated through the exercise of the police power of the state,
and that this control and regulation did not infringe upon any constitutional rights of the property owner." The court explained that every
citizen holds his property subject to the police power of the state and
7.
Wilhoit
8.
9.
10.
11.

See Cavanaugh v. Gerk, 313 Mo. 375, 280 S.W. 51 (En Banc 1926);
v. Springfield, 237 Mo. App. 775, 171 S.W.2d 95 (Spr. Ct. App. 1943).
235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911).
Id. at 108-12, 137 S.W. at 930-31.
Id. at 145, 137 S.W. at 942.
Id. at 156, 137 S.W. at 946.
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that even though laws and regulations may disturb the enjoyment of the
property of the citizen, they do not amount to the taking of private property for public use. Rather, they simply regulate the use of property.'2
Zoning ordinances are a form of regulation of the use of property which
presented a considerable problem for the courts when they were originally
adopted. In 1893 the Missouri "Boulevard Law," 1 8 which allowed cities
to enact ordinances designating certain streets as boulevards which would
have "minimum set-back" requirements, was held by the Missouri Supreme
Court to be unconstitutional. 14 The court did not find the concept of zoning inherently unconstitutional, but held that any statute which restricted
the property owners' right to "freely use, enjoy and dispose" of any property constituted a "taking" for which just compensation must be paid.' 5
In the case of In re Kansas City Ordinance No. 89946,16 the supreme
court specifically upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance which established set-back requirements and prohibited commercial use of property on
Gladstone Boulevard. However, the ordinance contemplated payment of
damages to persons whose property was adversely affected by the ordinance.
The court held that zoning ordinances of this type were a legitimate exercise of the police power in the interest of "health, safety, morality, general enjoyment, and education of the community."1 7 It is interesting to note
that the court in this case used as the basis of its holding the same reasoning
it followed in the Gunning case. Ordinances which created boulevards were
found to eliminate "nuisances," just as did the ordinance limiting the size
and type of billboards.
The concept that zoning ordinances were within the police power solely
because they prevented "nuisances," as well as the requirement of payment of damages to property owners whose use of their property was limited
by zoning, was swept away by the remarkably liberal decision of a conservative United States Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.' s
The Euclid City Council had passed an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan for the village which divided it into six districts.
Ambler Realty Company owned a tract which it had held for the purpose of
developing for industrial uses. As a result of the zoning ordinance, this
area was to be strictly residential.
Ambler argued that prior to the enactment of the ordinance its property was worth $10,000 per acre, but if the ordinance were applied to it,
its market value would decline to no more than $2,500 per acre. It therefore sought to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance on the ground that
it constituted a violation of Ambler's right to due process and equal pro12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 162, 137 S.W. at 949.
Mo. Laws 1891, at 47.
City of St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, 22 S.W. 861 (1893).
Id. at 584, 22 S.W. at 862-68.
298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (En Banc 1928).
Id. at 598, 252 S.W. at 409.
272 U.S. 865 (1926).
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tection of the law. The Supreme Court did not consider whether or not the
effect of the ordinance was to take Ambler's property without just compensation. Rather, the court reviewed cases and authorities which supported
the value of zoning laws, and held that it could not be said of the ordinance
that it was "dearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."' 19
Armed with the Supreme Court's decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., and, undoubtedly, in light of considerable public demand for the effectuation of zoning ordinances, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed its
prior decisions requiring compensation for property depreciated in value
20
as a result of zoning in State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher.
There, Oliver Cadillac was refused a building permit because an automobile showroom and garage which it intended to build did not conform to
the uses permitted by a St. Louis zoning ordinance which was to become
effective two days later. The court upheld the zoning ordinance, stating that
it would be impossible to create a comprehensive zoning plan for the city
if compensation had to be paid to all property owners adversely affected.
It then held that zoning ordinances similar to that enacted by St. Louis
were valid exercises of the police power for which compensation need not
be paid.2 '

Later, the court was to rationalize that "[e]very valid exercise of the
22
police power is apt to effect the property of some one [sic] adversely."
Thus, the concept of the exercise of the police power without payment to
adversely affected landowners has expanded considerably in the last fifty
years. While the original cases which required compensation are probably
more logically acceptable, the courts have recognized the arguably paramount need for adequate zoning and have permitted the enactment of
zoning ordinances which do not provide for compensation.2 3 At least the
Missouri courts can be complimented on candidly dealing with the problem of denying compensation to adversely affected landowners.
B. The "Rule of Common Injury"
The greatest source of injustice which has arisen from the concept of
damnum absque injuria stems from the "rule of common injury," which
has been recognized by Missouri courts for almost 100 years. Perhaps as
good a statement of the rule as any was made in one of the earliest cases,
19. Id. at 395.
20. 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W. 720 (En Banc 1927). The majority opinion did
not mention the cases it overruled. Id. at 1197, 298 S.W. at 727 (dissenting opinion
of Graves, J.).
21. Id. at 1193, 298 S.W. at 724-25.
22. Flora Realty &Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 862 Mo. 1025, 1040, 246 S.W.2d
771, 779, appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952).
23. However, one important limitation on the police power is that zoning
laws may not unreasonably eliminate or phase out nonconforming uses of property. Hoffman v. Kenialy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc 1965).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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Rude v. City of St. Louis:24 "[T]he property owner must show, to entitle
him to recover damages ... that the damages are peculiar to him, different
in kind, and not merely in degree, from those suffered by other members of
the community."12 The significant effect of the rule is illustrated by the
most typical factual situations in which it has been applied.
1. Traffic
The general rule is that abutting property owners have no right in
the traffic, great or small, on a highway; they do not have a right to recover damages for a decrease in value of their premises by reason of diversion of traffic away from their property, nor do they have a property
right to have the same amount of traffic pass their property, or move in
the same direction. 26
27
The presence of traffic not only affects access to and from property;
it also influences the business interests of property owners who depend on
traffic to sustain their existence, such as motel and restaurant owners. It
can also affect esthetic values which greatly influence the price of residential property. However, regardless of how much harm or benefit accrues to
the owner of real property as a result of the movement of vehicles on the
public roadways, this factor may not be considered in Missouri. For example, in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Turk28 part of the
defendants' dairy farm was taken for the construction of Interstate Highway 44. Defendants argued that the rule of common injury should not
apply to them, as the amount of noise generated by diesel trucks ascending
a grade near their home was greater than that heard by other persons
residing in their neighborhood. The court disagreed, holding that although
there may be a difference in degree, the annoyance from the noise was
29
shared by all the residents in the neighborhood.
Similarly, the condemnor may not claim that the affected property
has been "benefited" by an increase in traffic. The same reason is used:
The increased flow of traffic benefits the area generally, and not the condemnee's property specifically.8 0 However, it has been held that where
traffic on a road has the effect of severing one part of a tract from another,
resulting in either inconvenience in its use or restriction in its future uses,
traffic may be considered.81
24. 93 Mo. 408, 6 S.W. 257 (1887).
25. Id. at 414-15, 6 S.W. at 258.
26. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Meier, 388 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Mo.
En Banc 1965).
27. See pt. II, § B (2) of this article.
28. 366 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. 1963).
29. Id. at 422. See also Chicago Great W. R.R. v. Kemper, 256 Mo. 279, 166
S.W. 291 (1915) (noise of trains).
30. State ex YeL. State Highway Comm'n v. Parker, 387 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.
1965).
31. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Galeener, 402 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.
1966); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Clevenger, 291 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1956).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss4/1
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Traffic should be a factor considered in the payment of damages in
condemnation. If residential property is burdened by an increase in traffic
which results from the widening of a previously quiet street, this factor
should be legally considered by the jury. If, on the other hand, property
which is amenable to commercial uses is benefited by the channeling of
traffic to the property (assuming that access is available), this should be
viewed as a potential special benefit. The courts are in fact engaging in a
legal fiction in stating that the presence or absence of traffic on roadways is
common to the neighborhood as a whole, as anyone living on a busy street
knows.
2. Interference with Access to Streets and Highways
The courts of Missouri have also uniformly held that where access to
property is restricted as a result of highway or road improvements, but not
eliminated, there is generally no recovery for inconvenience caused to the
abutting property owners. Again, the rationale used to achieve this result
is that limitation of access is sustained generally by other property owners
and hence no compensation should be allowed.
The first class of cases arises from obstructions of streets or highways
which allow traffic to go in one direction but not another. The rule that
this type of obstruction does not result in compensable damage was estab.
lished by a series of early cases,82 the first of which was Rude v. City of
3 In the Rude
St. Louis.S
case the landowner's property abutted a street on
which railroad tracks were constructed at a lower elevation, thereby preventing travel to the south. However, the street was still open to the north.
The court held that the inconvenience of not being able to go south was
noncompensable because it was general to everyone wishing to use the
street, even though the injury was greater to the abutting landowner.
A second class of street cases involves the rights of non-abutting
property owners. In Glasgow v. City of St. Louis3 4 the court held that no
proprietary interest of a non-abutting real estate owner was affected when
the city vacated a public street for the use of a private corporation. The
court distinguished between the rights of abutting and non-abutting property owners, stating that "[t]here is no doubt but a property owner has an
easement in a street upon which his property abuts, which is special to him,
and should be protected." 5 This rule has been consistently followed by the
Missouri courts, and recovery is never available to non-abutting property
owners for vacation of streets or alleys. 6 However, if access to property is
32. Rude v. City of St. Louis, 93 Mo. 408, 6 S.W. 257 (1887); Fairchild v.
City of St. Louis, 97 Mo. 85, 11 S.W. 60 (1889); Camnan v. City of St. Louis, 97
Mo. 92, 11 S.W. 60 (1889); Glasgow v. City of St. Louis, 107 Mo. 198, 17 S.W.
743 (1891); Gorman v. Chicago, B. &cQ. RR., 255 Mo. 483, 164 S.W. 509 (1914).
33. 93 Mo. 408, 6 S.W. 257 (1887).
34. 107 Mo. 198, 17 S.W. 743 (1891).
35. Id. at 204, 17 S.W. at 745.
36. See Wilson v. Kansas City, 162 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1942); Arcadia Realty
Co. v. City of St. Louis, 326 Mo. 273, 30 S.W.2d 995 (1930); Christy v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R.R., 240 Mo. App. 642, 212 S.W.2d 476 (K.C. Ct. App. 1948).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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completely blocked so that the owner has no access whatsoever, he may
then recover damages for the taking of the easement of access.87 On the
other hand, abutting owners may recover damages even though they retain
access to other streets (although this fact may be considered in mitigation
3
of damages). s
Limited access highways have caused a third class of cases to arise.
Most of the decisions in this area rely on earlier opinions, such as Rude,
concerning the blocking of access to city streets by railroads. As a result,
the newer cases do not reflect much recognition of changing economic conditions.
In one such case, State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Clevenger,3 9 the landowner's property abutted old Highway 69. The State Highway Commission condemned an additional right-of-way for a new westbound lane adjoining the old highway. Apparently, the landowner still
had access by way of a county road to the eastbound lane of Highway 69,
but he was denied access to the westbound lane.4 0 The owner claimed that
he was entitled to damages for the taking of an easement of access to the
new westbound roadway. However, the court held that because he had never
had prior access to this new lane "the supposed deprivation of a right of
access to the road itself could not constitute a compensable element of
damage." 4 1 The court did not rely on the rule of common injury, but
limited its decision to the fact that a landowner cannot recover damages
for being deprived of access which he never before had possessed. The court
did, however, distinguish the facts from those presented in State ex rel.
State Highway Commission v. James.42 In James, the court had upheld
the power of the state to condemn property for a limited access highway,
but went on to state "[i]n addition to an interest in the fee, abutting
owners have an easement of access from their property to the highway.
This constitutes a property right, an interest in land."4 8
In State ex rel State Highway Commission v. Meier4l the court went
considerably further in applying the rule of common injury to restriction
of access to limited access highways. In that case, a motel owner had
previously had access by two driveways to Highway 67, which was then a
two-lane highway. After the completion of the project, Highway 67 was to
become a limited-access highway which would utilize the old pavement as an
"outer roadway." However, ingress and egress to the property would not be
37.
(1894);
1941).
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Knapp, Stout &Co. v. St. Louis Transfer Ry., 126 Mo. 26, 28 S.W. 627
Siemers v. St. Louis Elec. Terminal Ry., 348 Mo. 682, 155 S.W.2d 130
Heinrich v. City of St. Louis, 125 Mo. 424, 28 S.W. 626 (1894).
291 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1956).
Id. at 62.
Id.
356 Mo. 1161, 205 S.W.2d 534 (En Banc 1947).
Id. at 1168, 205 S.W.2d at 537.
388 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. En Banc 1965).
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possible except at interchanges some distance to the north and south of
the motel. The court held that the motel owner could not recover because
the inconvenience occasioned by the limitation of access was common to
other landowners in the neighborhood, and a condemnee may only be
45
compensated for such items of damage as are special to him.
On the same day of the Meier decision, the supreme court also handed
46
down its decision in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Brockfeld.
There, the owner of a service station which previously adjoined and had
direct access to a two-lane highway alleged that he was entitled to damages
for loss of access when the old highway was reconstructed as a limited
access highway with four lanes. At the completion of the project the service station would have access to a south "outer roadway" which paralleled
the new highway and which would be connected to two interchanges approximately three miles east and west of the property.
The property owner alleged that, as a result of not having direct
access to Interstate 70, his pre-existing easement of access to the old highway was taken, thereby entitling him to compensation. In a very confusing opinion, the court restated the rule that a complete blocking of an
abutter's access is a taking of a property right in the nature of an easement,
but that ingress and egress to a particular lane of a highway and direction
of travel thereon can be regulated under the police power (without paying
compensation) where an abutter is "furnished unrestricted right of access
to a lane of the highway upon which his property abuts and which connects with the restricted lanes at designated points." 47 The court went on to
state that
[R]espondents have been furnished unrestricted access to a lane
of the highway, an outer road on its right-of-way, along the entire
front of their property. Therefore, any compensation resulting
from this situation would have to be for circuity of travel rather
than for loss of access to the highway.48
This is a remarkable result. As the dissenting opinion filed in the
case points out, the court distinguished between property owners whose
property is allowed access to a "service road" as opposed to an "outer

roadway." If a frontage road is constructed allowing access to the freeway
at only certain interchanges but which is itself in the highway right-of-way,
then there has been no loss of access because the frontage road allows "un-

restricted access to a lane of the highway" and, hence, there is no recovery
for damages. On the other hand, if the property owner is located on a
"service road" (which is a frontage road not within the limited access high-

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 859.
388 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. En Banc 1965).
Id. at 864.
Id.
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way right-of-way), then there has been a denial of access and the property
owner is entitled to compensation. 49
This distinction is logically untenable and manifestly unfair to property owners who are unlucky enough to have their access road one which
is designated as an "outer roadway" rather than a "service road." The
result of being deprived of direct access to the highway is identical to both
classes of property owners and all should be entitled to consideration of
the damages sustained by them as a result of the state's action.
The holding in Brockfeld was extended somewhat in State ex Tel.
State Highway Commission v. DeMarco.50 There the owner of a service
station was denied compensation because he was allowed access to a
four-lane interstate highway on a "spur" outer roadway which terminated
on his property, even though the "spur" provided travel in only one direction. 51
Finally, the supreme court has also held that partial obstruction of
access to property resulting from the construction of traffic islands is non52
compensable.
C. Depreciation in the Value of Property Arising from the
Threat of Condemnation
The indirect influence of a taking of private land for public use can
also gravely affect the value of property. If the announcement of a new
public works project causes land values to depredate in the area involved,
then, logically, the owner of the property affected should not be expected
to underwrite the cost of the state's land acquisition by being prevented
from showing to the trier of fact that the value of his property on the date
of taking was depreciated by the announcement of the planned eminent
domain proceeding. In a majority of the states which have considered the
problem this is the law;5s in Missouri it is not.
In Brunn v. Kansas City54 a landowner whose property was taken for
park purposes argued that he should be paid interest on an award for
damages which resulted from the taking of his property. In that case the
landowner had appealed a freeholder jury's assessment of damages which
was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court. The landowner then brought
another action to obtain interest on the judgment, which was denied. The
supreme court held that inconvenience and delay were necessary incidents
of the exercise of the power of eminent domain and that neither
the ingenuity nor wit of man has hitherto been adequate to the
discovery of any plan.., for the establishment of boulevards, parks
49.
50.
51.
52.
58.
54.

Id. at 868 (dissenting opinion).
422 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1968).
Id. at 649.
Kansas City v. Berkshire Lumber Co., 393 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. 1965).
See cases cited note 74 infra.

216 Mo. 108, 115 S.W. 446 (1909).
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and streets, ideally equitable and free from inequalities and unfairness in an easily imagined case. I doubt not that such Utopian plan
for the future is but the irridescent [sic] dream of a dreamer.65
From this inauspicious start many evils were spawned.
In State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Beck,58 the City of St. Louis passed
an ordinance for the widening of a boulevard. The commissioner's hearing
was held as to the assessment of benefits and damages but during the
pendency of the proceedings a new ordinance was passed which changed
the lines of the street. One of the condemnees sought to introduce evidence
in the second Commissioner's hearing that his property had been damaged
as a result of the pendency of the first action. The damage claimed resulted from the condemnee's inability to rent the property for a definite
period of time; his inability to improve the property; his inability to sell
the property at a fair price; and his inability to finance the property upon
reasonable terms. The supreme court held that these alleged items of damage were not compensable because the "condemnation suit in no way affected the property itself and, therefore, did not damage the property."5 7
In conjunction with these decisions the supreme court held in City
of St. Louis v. InternationalHarvester Co.58 that section 26 of article I
of the Missouri Constitution requires that damages be assessed as of the
date of taking, i.e., when the amount of the Commissioner's award is paid
into the registry of the court. 59
These cases formed the foundation of the court's recent decision in
St. Louis Housing Authority v. Barnes.60 The Barnes case was the first
in Missouri to squarely raise the question of whether the jury can consider
the decline in value of property caused by the announcement of eminent
domain proceedings. The court ruled that such evidence could not be
introduced, holding that "if the appellants suffered damages for which the
respondent is liable by reason of the condemnation action, such damages are
not part of the damages for the taking and, under the Beck decision, are
not an item of just compensation .. . .,61
The supreme court was urged to recant on these unfortunate cases in
an excellent dissenting opinion filed in Land Clearancefor Redevelopment
Authority v. Morrison.6 2 The key issue in Morrison was the propriety of
the dismissal of the condemnee's counterclaim which alleged that the Authority had exercised domain over the property commencing on the day the
55. Id. at 120, 115 S.W. at 450.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

333 Mo. 1118, 63 S.W.2d 814 (En Banc 1933).
Id. at 1125, 63 S.W.2d at 816.
350 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. En Banc 1961).
Id. at 785. See also City of St. Louis v. Vasquez, 341 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. 1961).
375 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1964).
Id. at 148. This holding was most recently followed by the supreme court

in State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Samborski, 463 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. 1971).
62. 457 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
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renewal plan was filed. The landowner pointed out that the Authority
had held a public hearing making it clear that the property would be taken;
had enticed tenants of the property to leave knowing that if the premises
were vacated they would be Vandalized and would depreciate in value; and
had delayed filing the condemnation suit for 18 months, thereby making
the property unusable. Based on this, the landowner sought an award for
the decline in market value of the property from the filing of the plan to the
date of taking almost two years later.
The supreme court found that the record in the case failed to reflect
a situation of "aggravated delay or untoward activity on the part of the
Authority ... ."68 The court also reviewed several cases from other jurisdictions where damages were allowed for depredation in value of property
during the pendency of the condemnation proceedings. In one, the Ohio
case of Sayre v. United States, 4 the plaintiff alleged that notices and public
announcements more than four years earlier, piecemeal acquisition of property in the area, refusal of applications for permits to repair and improve
property, and deterioration of municipal services caused the property to
become unrentable. The resulting vandalism caused even greater loss of
value. The court held the allegations sufficient to state a cause of action
against the city for a taking without just compensation. 65
Another case reviewed was the Michigan case of Foster v. City of Detroit66 A housing plan for Detroit was first proposed in 1949; suit was
filed over a year later, but was dismissed after ten years without decision.
Meanwhile, an urban renewal project was developed for the area and new
condemnation proceedings were commenced thirteen years after the original
announcement of the housing plan. Plaintiffs had been warned at the
time of the original notice not to make improvements, and issuance of
building permits for the area was conditioned on signing a waiver of
damages. Nonetheless, the city later ordered plaintiffs to make costly repairs to meet city standards or tear down the buildings since vandalism had
destroyed the buildings after adjacent blocks had been condemned. The
city was required to pay the value of the buildings before the depredation,
due to the city's actions. 67
The final case reviewed was City of Cleveland v. Carcione,6 8 which
involved an urban renewal plan announced two-and-one-half years prior to
the filing of eminent domain proceedings. In the interim the city welfare
department ordered tenants on relief to move or have rent aid cut off,
property was acquired and demolished in a piecemeal fashion (over 90%
of the nearly 600 buildings had been razed before this suit was filed), and a
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 199.
282 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
Id. at 186.
254 . Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
Id. at 662.
118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963).
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lack of police protection resulted in destruction of the property through
vandalism. The court held that determining damages at the time of trial
would be unreasonable and unjust under the circumstances. 69
The Missouri court acknowledged that the facts in these cases presented situations in which the traditional rules of valuation failed to meet
constitutional requirements. However, the court distinguished the facts presented in Morrison, and stated that "[i]f such cases arise in Missouri they
will be dealt with on their facts." 70 The decision leaves unanswered the important question of what constitutes "aggravated delay" or "untoward activity" on the part of the condemnor such as will allow recovery for depredation in value of the property after announcement of eminent domain
proceedings.
The dissenting opinion in Morrison cogently distinguished the cases
relied on by the majority and approved the rule that "where the condemning authority by its actions causes depreciation in value of the property
prior to a taking in the usual sense, the landowner is entitled to compensation therefor."'71
In reaching its result, the majority did not take into account a number
of cases which follow the rule that any depreciation caused by a public improvement shall not be considered in determining fair market value. For
example, the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.72 that
[t]he court must exclude any depredation in value caused by the
prospective taking once the Government "was committed" to the
project .... As one writer has pointed out, "it would be mani-

festly unjust to permit a public authority to depreciate property
values by a threat... of the construction of a government project
and then to take advantage of this depression in the price which it
must pay for the property" when eventually condemned. 73
This view is surely the better rule and is followed by the majority of
courts which have considered the matter. 74 It is not reasonable to expect the
69. Id. at 532, 190 N.E.2d at 57.
70. Land Clearance for Redev. Authority v. Morrison, 457 S.W.2d 185, 199
.(Mo. En Banc 1970). The court also reviewed other cases where similar declines
in value were held to be noncompensable. These cases are: Redevelopment
Agency v. Maynard, 244 Cal. App. 2d 260, 53 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1966); Housing
Authority v. Schroeder, 113 Ga. App. 432, 148 S.E.2d 188 (1966); and Naumann
v. Urban Renewal Agency, 411 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
71. Land Clearance for Redev. Authority v. Morrison, 457 S.W.2d 185, 204
(Mo. En Banc 1970) (dissenting opinion of Finch, J., in which Donnelly and

SeLler, JJ., joined).

72. 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
73. Id. at 636.
74. See Murray v. United States, 130 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Edlin v.
Security Ins. Co., 160 F. Supp. 487 (S.D. IlL. 1957); State Road Dep't v. Chicone,
158 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1963); Tharp v. Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency,
389 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1965); Lipinski v. Lynn Redev. Authority, 246 N.E.2d 429
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landowner to partially underwrite the cost of public projects by denying
him the fair market value of his property as it obtained before the announcement of the project. The Missouri rule is particularly harsh on
inner-city property owners who may have a considerable investment in
residences which are prone to be taken by urban renewal and highway
projects. After the announcement of planned condemnation proceedings,
the neighborhood typically deteriorates rapidly with tenants leaving the
area and abandoning property which is, in turn, vandalized. The property owner finds that he cannot readily sell his property and is forced to
either abandon his equity or continue to live in a rapidly deteriorating
neighborhood. Then, when the condemning authority finally takes his
property, the value of his land is reduced to the point that he has difficulty replacing it with another home. The burden of financing redevelopment projects and other public improvements should devolve upon the
general taxpayers and not those persons who are unlucky enough to have
their property taken in protracted eminent domain proceedings. 75
(Mass. 1969); Housing &Redev. Authority v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 273
Minn. 256, 141 N.W.2d 130 (1966); Becos v. Masheter, 15 Ohio St. 2d 15, 238
N.E.2d 548 (1968); Wadsworth v. Manufacturers' Water Co., 256 Pa. 106, 100 A.
577 (1917); and State v. Carswell, 384 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Cf.
United States v. Certain Lands, 47 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); City of Oakland v. Partridge, 214 Cal. App. 2d 196, 29 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1963); Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 57 P.2d 575 (1936); and
Chicago Housing Authority v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790 (1961).
75. The court in Morrison could have found Missouri precedent for ruling
the other way. In St. Louis Elec. Terminal Ry. v. MacAdaras, 257 Mo. 448, 166
S.W. 307 (1914), the property in question was condemned for railroad freight and
passenger depot purposes. The overall plan for condemnation included the taking
of the condemnees' property, but before this property was taken construction of
the new depot was partially completed. The property owner sought to have the
increase in value of his property resulting from the construction of the depot
considered in determining his damages. The court rejected this argument, and
found that in light of the fact that the construction of the depot and the taking
of the condemnee's property were all part of one continuous act, any enhancement
in value as a result of the depot could not be considered. The court stated:
If, when property is taken in toto, as here, it be the rule that the owner
can have considered, as an element of his damages, the enhanced value of
the property occasioned by a partial construction of the railroad, and its
incidents (such as depots, switches, etc.), then the converse of the proposition should likewise be true; i.e., that, if a partial construction of the
contemplated road and its incidents, above named, had depreciated
the property sought to be taken, then the railroad should have the benefit
of such depreciation, when it actually came to the taking of the property.
No court would stand for this latter rule, and yet it is the very converse of
the one sought to be enforced here. The proper rule, when the whole
property is being taken, is not to allow the jury to consider either enhancements or depreciation brought about by the construction of the
improvement for which the property is being taken. In other words, the
value should be determined independent of the proposed improvement.
Id. at 463, 166 S.W. at 310.
This language can certainly be interpreted to mean that because a possible
depreciation in value caused by the construction of the public improvement is not
to be considered, the property should be valued at a time prior to the announcehttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss4/1
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D. Speculative and Remote Consequences
It is stated generally that
"[i]n arriving at just compensation in condemnation proceedings
the damages awarded must be definite and certain; they are not to
be based upon contingent, speculative and remote possibilities,
but upon considerations of reasonable probability; the damages
awarded should be those reasonably to be expected from the
taking."76
The types of damages which the courts have most often held to be "speculative" involve possible future improper or illegal use of the condemned
property and loss of future profits from businesses.
1. Future Improper or Illegal Uses of Condemned Property
Taken in Part
The temptation of condemnees' attorneys to argue to juries the
possible horrors of breaking or falling electric transmission lines seems
to be very great. Such an argument, or evidence concerning it, is a routine
source of reversal of jury awards, however. For example, in the frequently
cited case of Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Creed,7 the owner of a dairy
farm over which a power line easement was to be impressed introduced
several factors which the court considered speculative and violative of the
rule that future improper use of the easement cannot be considered in as.
sessing damages.
The landowner's witnesses testified that the presence of strangers
patrolling the easement might frighten cattle on the property so that they
would stampede, lose weight, and perhaps be crippled. The court found
that such testimony was proper because this was a "reasonable probability of
fact" arising from the proper use of the easement.78 However, additional
testimony concerning the likelihood of the electric company's employees
introducing hog cholera by their patrolling was rejected as too speculative.
Other testimony concerning the chance that gates might be left open, or
that employees of the condemnor might deliberately trespass off the rightof-way and do damage to the remaining pasture, was held to be in contravention of the basic theory that recovery must be limited to damages, present
or prospective, which arises from risks and hazards which are known or
may be reasonably expected to result from the construction and maintenance of the power line in a proper and legal manner. By the same token,
ment of the contemplated condemnation proceeding. Strangely, the Missouri Supreme Court cites the language above in the majority opinion in Morrison. See
457 S.W.2d at 197.
76. Land Clearance for Redev. Corp. v. Doernhoefer, 389 S.W.2d 780, 786
(Mo. 1965).
77. 82 S.W.2d 783 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930).
78. Id. at 788.
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testimony concerning the possibility of a wire breaking was viewed as a
consequence not reasonably to be apprehended.7 9
Later, in State ex rel. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Gauld,80 an
argument to the jury that electric wires might break on an easement and
injure or kill persons or livestock was held improper in that it was purely
speculative because the evidence showed that the transmission line was
8
equipped with circuit breakers. '
82
In State ex rel. N.W. Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Waggoner,
a witness was allowed to discuss the possible effect of hunters shooting at
power lines. The appellate court held that such evidence was purely speculative and conjectural, and that "[i]f a hunter did such a foolish and wrongful act there is an available remedy against the wrongdoer."8 3 All of these
cases are illustrative of the general rule that possible tortious, wrongful or
illegal acts are not compensable in eminent domain proceedings.8 4
2. Loss of Future Profits from Business Operations
Another area in which the courts have denied payment of damages to
persons whose property is taken in condemnation is that involving losses
due to business interruption or discontinuance of business. When evidence
of this type has been offered, the courts have uniformly held that it is
"too speculative" and cannot be admitted. This does not include, of course,
evidence tending to show that the value of property is enhanced by possible
future uses. 8 5
In City of St. Louis v. St. Louis LM. & S. Ry., 8 6 the landowner sought
compensation for the cost of removing his stock of goods and fixtures to his
new location and installing them therein; the depredation in value of these
goods and fixtures caused by the removal and reinstallation; and for the
injury to his business caused by its interruption during the period of
moving. The court held that such damages were too "speculative" and
remote for consideration and should not be allowed.8 7 In City of St. Louis
v. ParamountShoe Manufacturing Co.,88 the court approved the rule that
no recovery can be allowed for loss of profits or for injury to business as
such, which are too speculative and remote to be considered. However, the
79. Id.
80. 360 Mo. 795, 230 S.W.2d 850 (En Banc 1950).
81. Id. at 806, 230 S.W.2d at 856.
82. 319 S.W.2d 930 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
83. Id. at 935.
84. See KAMO Elec. Coop. v. Baker, 287 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. 1956); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Jennemann, 407 S.W.2d 85 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
85. "Ifhe jury may consider uses of the land for which it is reasonably suitable, having regard to the existing business wants of the community, or such as
may be reasonably expected in the future." In re Armory Site, 282 S.W.2d 464,
470 (Mo. 1955).
86. 266 Mo. 694, 182 S.W. 750 (Mo. 1915).
87. Id. at 707, 182 S.W. at 753-54.
88. 237 Mo. App. 200, 168 S.W.2d 149 (St. L. Ct. App. 1943) Court.
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court allowed evidence tending to show that as a result of the taking of
part of the condemnee's property, it would be hindered by the inability to
89
expand its building.
In St. Louis Housing Authority v. Bainter,90 part of the property on
which a service station was located was condemned, and the owner introduced evidence showing the amount and value of gasoline sold at the
station. The owner argued that a recognized standard for determining the
fair market value of service station property is based on its reasonable
rental value, which, in turn, relates to the average number of gallons sold
per month. The condemnor argued that it was improper to show the
volume of business done by the station in that it introduced the element of
loss of future profits from the operation of the business. The court rejected
this view, holding that
evidence of gallonage of gasoline sold on the premises is properly
admitted... on the issue of rental value and fair market value of
the premises condemned where, by accepted standards and criteria
in the trade or business, rentals and values of such property are
based thereon. 91
In contrast, the court in State ex rel. Kansas City Power & Light Co.
v. Salmark Home Builders,Inc., 92 upheld a jury instruction which withdrew
from the jury's consideration testimony concerning the present fair market
value of land which was based on future profits which the owner might
anticipate if the property was subdivided and improved for residential lots.
The court once again stated the rule that damages for injury for the remainder of land after it is taken must be direct and certain at the time of
appropriation and not remote or speculative, and that loss of profits in its
usual regard is too speculative to be considered as a basis for damages.9 3
Therefore, the rule is dear that anticipated future profits and interruption from business caused by eminent domain proceedings may not be
considered. However, where the nature or volume of business is relevant in
ascertaining the fair market value of the property, or future inconvenience
to business operations, then such evidence may be introduced.
III. CONCLUSION

The trend at the federal level is to expand the scope of compensation
to those affected by governmental activity. Perhaps the best example is the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968.94 This Act provides for a relocation assistance program, including relocation payments to owners of property
89. Id. at 215, 168 S.W.2d 154.
90. 297 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1957).
91. Id. at 535.

92. 875 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1964).

98. Id. at 98-99.
94. 28 U.S.C. §§ 502-11 (Supp. IV, 1968).
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taken for federal aid highways. The displaced property owner is guaranteed reimbursement for moving himself, his family, his business, or his
farm operation, including personal property.9 5 He is also entitled to a replacement housing allowance of up to $5000 added to the "acquisition payment," to enable him to purchase a comparable dwelling if he has actually
occupied the condemned property for not less than one year prior to
the initiation of negotiations for acquisition. If he does not meet this requirement, but if he has occupied the property for not less than 90 days
prior to the initiation of negotiations, he is entitled to a payment not to
exceed $1,500.9 6 The Act also requires the state to reimburse the owner for
recording fees, transfer taxes, penalty costs for prepayment of mortgages, and
a pro-rata portion of real property taxes. 97 None of these payments are subject to federal income taxation. 98
Congress has definitely taken a step in the right direction by enacting
this statute, but similar relief should be available to persons whose property is taken for non-federally financed highways and other public improvements. New state legislation should provide that the fair market value of
property taken will be determined without the consideration of any increase or decrease in value caused by the initiation of the condemnation
proceeding or the presence of the improvement itself. However, if property
is taken subsequent to a prior public improvement this factor should be
taken into account.
While certain exercises of the police power or the power of eminent
domain result in increases or decreases in the value of property, not all of
these effects should be taken into account in determining fair market value.
However, the significant change in the extent and type of public improvements which are now being undertaken, accompanied by the broader base
of real property ownership, requires that new methods of determining value
be instituted to protect the constitutional guarantee that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. § 505.
Id. § 506.
Id. § 507.
Id.
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